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THE TAPE PIRACY CASES:
JUDICIAL CREATION OF A FEDERAL
COPYRIGHT INTEREST IN SOUND
RECORDINGS*
JOHN P. MESSINA**
INTRODUCTION
Under the Copyright Act,' sound recordings are treated as in-
volving two separate and distinct property interests. One is the in-
terest of the composer in the underlying musical composition which is
reproduced aurally by the recording. 2 The other is the interest of the
* This article is adapted from a paper which received First Prize in the 1975 Bos-
ton College Nathan Burkan Memorial Copyright Competition.
**A.B., SUNY at Stony Brook, 1971; J.D., Boston College, 1975; Instructor in
Law, University of Illinois College of Law.
' 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-215 (1970).
Id. 4 I provides:
Any person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this
title. shall have the exclusive right: ...
(e) To perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a musical
composition; and for the purpose of public performance for profit, and
for the purposes set forth in subsection (a) hereof, to make any arrange-
ment or setting oftit or of the melody of it in any system of notation or
any form of record in which the thought of any author may be recorded
and from which it may be read or reproduced: Provided, That the provi-
sions of this title, so far as they secure copyright controlling the parts of
instruments serving to reproduce mechanically the musical work, shall in-
clude only compositions published and copyrighted after July I,
1909 .... And as a condition of extending the copyright control to such
mechanical reproductions, that whenever the owner of a musical copyright
has used or permitted or knowingly acquiesced in the use of the copy-
righted work upon the parts of instruments serving to reproduce mechan-
ically the musical work, any other person may make similar use of the
copyrighted work upon the payment to the copyright proprietor of a roy-
alty of 2 cents on each such part manufactured, to he paid by the man-
ufacturer thereof .... The payment of the royalty provided for by this
section shall free the articles or devices for which such royalty has been
paid from further contribution to the copyright except in case of public
performance for profit. It shall be the duty of the copyright owner, if he
uses the musical composition himself for the manufacture of parts of in-
struments serving to reproduce mechanically the musical work, or licenses
others to do so, to file notice thereof', accompanied by a recording fee, in
the copyright office, and any failure to file such notice shall be a complete
defense to any suit, action, or proceeding for any infringement of such
copyright.
In case of failure of such manufacturer to pay to the copyright
proprietor within thirty days after demand in writing the full sum of
royalties due at said rate at the date of such demand, the court may award
taxable costs to the plaintiff and a reasonable counsel fee, and the court
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manufacturer in the recording itself, a derivative working of the mus-
ical composition which the Copyright Act, as amended in 1971, makes
eligible for a copyright on its own merits.' So far as recordings of his
musical composition are concerned, a composer has only limited con-
trol over his property interests. Section 1(e) of the Act provides that,
once a composer has licensed, either expressly or impliedly, a first use
of his musical composition in sound recording, a compulsory license
arises in favor of any other person who makes "similar use of the
copyright work"' provided he complies with two explicit conditions:
the filing of a notice of intent to use the copyrighted compositions
and payment of statutory royalties.' The unauthorized manufacture
or "pirating" of records reproducing a copyrighted composition will
subject the sound recording pirate to severe civil and criminal
penalties.'
may, in its discretion, enter judgment therein for any sum in addition over
the amount found to be due as royalty in accordance with the terms of this
title, not exceeding three times such amount....
3 17 U.S.C. I (Supp. III, 1973) provides:
Any person entitled 'thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this
title, shall have the exclusive right: ...
(0 To reproduce and distribute to the public by sale or other trans-
fer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending, reproductions of the
copyrighted work if it be a sound recording: Provided, That the exclusive
right of the owner of a copyright in a sound recording to reproduce it is
limited to the right to duplicate the sound recording in a tangible form
that directly or indirectly recaptures the actual sounds fixed in the record-
ing: Provided further, That this right does not extend to the making or du-
plication of another sound recording that is an independent fixation of
other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate those in the
copyrighted sound recording; or to reproductions made by transmitting
organizations exclusively for their own use....
4 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1970) (emphasis added).
5 1d. § 101(e) (Supp. III, 1973).
"Id. § 1(e) (1970).
Id. § 101(e) (Supp. III, 1973) provides:
Interchangeable parts, such as discs or tapes for use in mechanical
music-producing machines adapted to reproduce copyrighted musicial
works, shall be considered copies of the copyrighted musical works which
they serve to reproduce mechanically for the purposes of this section 101
and sections 106 and 109 of this title, and the unauthorized manufacture,
use, or sale of such interchangeable parts shall constitute an infringement
of the copyrighted work rendering the infringer liable in accordance with
all provisions of this title dealing with infringements of copyright and, in a
case of willful infringement for profit, to criminal prosecution pursuant to
section 104 of this title. Whenever any person, in the absence of a license
agreement, intends to use a copyrighted musical composition upon the
parts of instruments serving to reproduce mechanically the musicial work,
relying upon the compulsory license provision of this title, he shall serve
notice of such intention, by registered mail, upon the copyright proprietor
at his last address disclosed by the records of the copyright office, sending
to the copyright office a duplicate of such notice.
Thus, the 1972 Sound Recording Act subjected manufacturers who failed to comply
with § l(e) as well as pirates to the civil remedies of § 101 and the criminal penalties of
§ 104.
170
THE TAPE PIRACY CASES
The manufacturer's property interest in the recording of the
copyrighted composition, so far as federal copyright law is concerned,
is limited to those recordings whose sounds were "fixed" on or after
February 15, 1972, the effective date of the Sound Recording Act."
Consequently, the manufacturer of a recording which was fixed prior
to that date may not pursue record and tape pirates with federal sanc-
tions. This is not to say that such a manufacturer is at the complete
mercy of the pirates. In Goldstein v. California,u the United States Su-
preme Court held that the states are free to regulate those categories
of "Writings" which, though capable of protection under the
Copyright clause of the Constitution,'" have been omitted by Congress
from the federal statutory scheme." To take full advantage of this
protection, however, the recording industry is forced to establish
favorable precedents" and statutes" in fifty separate jurisdictions.
Thus, manufacturers who must turn, to the states for protection of
their property interests do so with less certainty and more difficulty
than those of their brethren who have at their disposal a simple,
nation-wide remedy: the infringement provisions of the federal
copyright laws.
The position of this disadvantaged group of manufacturers has
recently taken a turn for the better, albeit in back-door fashion." A
Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391, amending 17 U.S.C. §§ I
et seq. Under the provisions of § 3 of the Act, its amendments of Title 17 were not ef-
fective until February 15, 1972. Id. § 3, 85 Stat. 392.
"412 U.S. 546 (1973).
'° U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
" 412 U.S. at 570.
"See, e.g., GAI Audio of New York, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.,
340 A.2d 736, 749 (Ct. Spec. App. Md. 1975); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v.
Melody Recordings, Inc., 134 N.J. Super. 368, 341 A.2d 348, 354-55 (1975) (tape pi-
rates held liable in both cases on grounds of "unfair competition"). For a lucid discus-
sion of creation by a state court of a common law cause of action for record piracy, see
Mercury Record Productions Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc., 64 Wis.2d 163, 218
N.W.2d 705 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 914 (1975). Cf. International News Serv. v. As-
sociated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
"See, e.g., Cm.. PENAL. CODE § 653(h) (West 1970) (piracy of sound recordings a
misdemeanor); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-4244-50 (Supp., 1974) (piracy of sound record-
ings a felony).
" Throughout this article reference is made to the "property interest of the
composer", the composer's copyright", etc. Although the composer's copyright is in-
deed the predicate for the holdings of the Tape Piracy cases, one should keep in mind
that it has long been the practice in the music industry for a composer to transfer all
the rights in his musical composition to a music publisher. See April Productions v. G.
Shirmer, Inc., 308 N.Y. 360, 370 (1955); W. BLAISDELL, THE ECONOMIC ASPECIS or THE
COMPULSORY LICENSE IN THE COPyRICHT LAW (Study No. 12 on the General Revision of
the Copyright Law 1958). Thus it is the music publisher, not the composer, who con-
tracts with a record manufacturer for the initial mechanical reproduction of a muscial
work, and who thereafter collects the mechanical royalties; and it is the music publisher,
not the composer, who controls the suits brought against alleged infringers and tape pi-
rates. In the sense that an infringement action against one who pirates sound record-
ings fixed before February 15, 1972 may only be instituted by a composer or by a pub-
lisher who has been assigned a composer's copyright, and not by a record manufac..
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recent series of split decisions from the Third," Fifth," Ninth" and
Tenth" Circuits [hereinafter collectively referred to as the Tape Piracy
cases] have held that the unauthorized duplication of sound record-
ings which were fixed prior to the effective date of the 1972 Sound
Recording Act constitute an infringement of the copyright of the
composer whose musical work is reproduced by the recording.
The fact patterns of all four cases were nearly identical." The
pirates purchased sound recordings of musical works in which plain-
tiffs held the copyrights. The pirates then made master tape record-
ings of these records, and from these masters they reproduced copies
for sale to retailers and to the general public. In all respects, the pi-
rates complied with the explicit conditions of section 1(e) by filing
notices of intent to use the copyrighted musical works and by tender-
ing to the copyright holders payment of the statutory royalties.
Nevertheless, all four circuit courts concluded that the tape pirates
did not thereby become compulsory licensees entitled to reproduce
Curer, the protection afforded the manufacturers is indeed ushered in through a back
door.
However, the fact that the manufacturers of pre-1972 sound recordings cannot
maintain infringement actions against tape pirates, and must instead rely on the music
publishers, does not in any way lessen the certainty that such prosecutions will be forth-
coming. Though the economic interests of publishers and manufacturers may at times
be antagonistic, see, e.g., Hearings on Copyright Revision Bill (H.R. 2223), before House Sub-
comm. No. 3 reported in PATENT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. No. 246 at A-I0 (Sept. 25,
1975), (National Music Publishers Association argued for a four cents mechanical roy-
alty instead of the three cents royalty contained in the revision bill, while the Recording
Industry Association of America opposed any increase from the present two cents roy-
alty, the ravages of inflation since 1909 notwithstanding), such antagonisms do not
dominate their relationship. For example r the Harry Fox Agency, which represents over
3,000 music publishers in connection with the mechanical reproduction of their
copyrighted musical works, Statement of Albert Berman on Behalf of the Harry Fox
Agency, Inc., Hearings on Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings, House Comm. on Judiciary,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (June 9, 1971), views the publishers as an integral part of the
recording industry, and therefore views any threat to the traditional economic structure
of the recording industry as a threat to the well-being of the publishers. Id. This state-
ment of the publishers' self interest may explain why their pursuit of tape pirates who
complied with the notice and royalty provisions of the compulsory license scheme be-
came overzealous at times. See, e.g., Jondora Music Publishing Cu. v. Melody Records,
Inc., 351 F. Supp. 570, 576 (D.N.J. 1972).
" Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 506 F.2d 392, 395
(3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975).
' 6 Fame Publishing Co. v. Alabama Custom Tape, Inc., 507 F.2d 667, 669-70 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S.Ct. 73 (1975).
" Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 458 F,2d 1305, 1310 (9th Cir.), cent. denied, 409
U.S. 847 (1972).
'" Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colorado Magnetics, Inc., 497 F.2d 285, 288
(10th Cir. 1974), tem denied, 419 U.S. 1120 (1975).
"See Marks Music, 497 F.2d at 286, 288; Duchess Music, 458 F.2d at 1306-07. For
a complete statement of the facts in the other cases see Fame Publishing Co. v. S & S
Distributors, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 984, 986-87 (N.D. Ala. 1973); Jondora Music Publishing
Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 488 (D.N.J. 1973).
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and sell copies of the musical works. 2" The courts reached this conclu-
sion by interpreting the words "similar use" in section 1(e) 2 ' as creat-
ing an implied condition that a would-be licensee independently per-
form the musical work sought to be reproduced. Since tape pirates
who duplicate the recordings of legitimate manufacturers thereby
make an "identical" use of the underlying musical work, they are not
in compliance with Section 1(e) and infringe the composer's
copyright. 22
From the manufacturers' point of view, the Tape Piracy cases fill
an unfortunate gap in the copyright laws in as much as they recognize
a new composer's interest which fills the void left by exclusion of
sound recordings from the Act's protections. Where the manufacturer
has purchased the composer's copyright," the manufacturer might
assert the composer's copyright interest in protection of his un-
copyrightable sound recording. In other cases,'" the composer might
perceive a sufficient community of interest with the manufacturer to
warrant assertion of his copyright for the benefit of the manufacturer.
The courts of appeals' discovery of this new tool for combatting
record piracy seems rather belated. Pirates have been around almost
as long as the sound recording industry itself." However, they did
not emerge as a serious economic threat to the recording industry
until the decade after World War II, when the long-playing record
(LP) replaced the ten-inch, 78 rpm single as the staple of the record
industry." LP's made it possible to reproduce popular hits more
cheaply and to combine them into attractive anthologies. During this
era, however, many pirates left themselves vulnerable to federal sanc-
tions by failing to pay composers their statutory royalties." Actions
brought in federal court by the industry on the ground that the
record pirates failed to pay the statutory royalties were a major part
of the legal strategy developed by the industry to combat the pirates,
and for a time the problem abated." However, the question of
whether pirates who complied with royalty requirements still violated
section 1(e) was left without an authoritative resolution. 2 "
The perfection of magnetic taping techniques in the 1960's, like
"Fame Publishing, 507 F.2d at 672; Mindoro Music, 506 F.2d at 397; Marks Music,
497 F.2d at 288; Duchess Music, 458 F.2d 1310.
2 ' 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1970). See note 2 supra.
22
 Duchess Music, 458 11 .2d at 1310. See Fame Publishing, 507 F.2d at 669-70;
Jondora Music, 506 F.2d at 395; Maths Music, 497 F.2d at 288.
"E.g., Duchess Music, 458 F.2d - at 1306-07.
" E.g., Fame Publishing, 507 F.2d at 668 a.l.
22 For a brief but lively account of the development of piracy as a serious
economic threat to the recording industry, see Note, 5 STAN. L. REV. 433, 433-43
(1953). See also Comment, Record Piracy and Copyright: Present Inadequacies and Future
Overkill, 23 MAINE L. REV. 359 (1971).
" Note, supra note 25 at 435-36.
22 See id. at 440-41,
"See id. at 439-40.
29 See text at notes 34-39 ityip.
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the development of the LP a decade earlier, raised the stakes involved
in piracy once again, and piracy became a greater problem than ever
before. Trade sources have estimated that pirated tapes account for
more than $100 million in sales annually, approximately one-quarter
of the annual volume of all pre-recorded tape sales in the United
States. 30
 Several reasons are generally given as to why the market for
pirated tapes is so large. The technology of tape recording is such
that the fidelity of sound on a pirated tape is usually quite good; in
fact, some consider the quality of certain pirated tapes to be superior
to that of national brand tapes." This factor, together with the ability
of the pirate to combine into one tape the more popular selections of
several "authorized" albums, makes for an attractive consumer
package." Given the popularity of tapes with music collectors, as well
as the legitimate recording industry's practice of retailing tape cas-
settes at a price one dollar higher than the price of an LP album of
the same recording, 33
 it is no surprise that the relatively inexpensive
pirate's wares are so popular with the public. And the tape pirates,
having learned a lesson from the record pirates' earlier skirmishes
with the recording industry, sought to protect their illicit market from
the reaches of federal law by complying in all respects with the com-
pulsory license provisions of the Copyright Act—or so they thought."
This belief was shattered when the Tape Piracy cases held, in effect,
that the loophole in the 1909 Act" which left sound recordings un-
protected and which the pirates and everyone else thought had only
been partially closed by the Sound Recordiug Act," had never in fact
existed. As a result, pirates may now be held criminally liable under
federal law, with a maximum sentence of up to one year in prison."
In addition, all pirated copies may be destroyed by court order" and
the pirates held civilly liable for damages and forfeiture of profits."
If there were no countervailing considerations, one might well
applaud the ingenious statutory interpretation. formulated by the four
circuit courts in the Tape Piracy cases to solve a problem which had
plagued the legitimate recording industry for so long. However, it is
difficult to square the practical effect of the Tape Piracy
cases—namely, the extension of copyright protection to the record-
ings themselves in cases brought by holders of the copyrights—with
36 H.R. REP. No. 1389, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974).
31
 Hearings on S. 646 and H.R. 6927 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on
the judiciary, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. 78 - 79 (1971).
32 Id. at 47.
33 Id. at 37.
"See, e.g., Duchess Musk; 458 F.2d at 1310.
33 Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1075.
36 See Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 362 F. Supp.
494, 497-98 (D.N.J. 1973), rend, 506 F.2d 392 (1974); H.R. Km No.487, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1971).
" 17 U.S.C. § 104 (1970). See text at notes 149 -51 irefra.
38
 Id. § 101(d).
36 /d. § 101(b).
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the Congressional understanding, both at the time of the 1909 revi-
sions of the Copyright laws 4° and the passage of the 1971 Sound Re-
cording Act," that mechanical reproductions of copyrighted musical
works "fixed" between 1909 and 1972 were without any federal pro-
tection at all. In Goldstein, the Supreme Court specifically relied on
this congressional understanding to hold that the regulation of such
"Writings" was within the domain of the states. 42 Thus, the Tape Pi-
racy cases managed not only to ignore a clear, albeit unwise, Congres-
sional policy, but also to eviscerate the role which Goldstein had carved
out for the states to play in this particular area.
I. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT WITH RESPECT TO PRE-1972 SOUND
RECORDINGS
At the turn of the century player pianos and similar machines
were quite popular and the manufacture and sale of perforated music
rolls for use in these machines had developed into a lucrative busi-
ness. In fact, these machines were so popular that the sale of perfo-
rated rolls caused a decline in the sale of sheet music." The result
was a detraction from the value of the exclusive copyright granted
composers whose work was "reproduced" on such rolls. Although the
copyright laws at the time explicitly granted composers the right to
control printed copies of their work, 44 the manufacturers of perfo-
rated rolls took the position that the manner in which copyrighted
musical works were used on perforated rolls did not infringe any
rights secured by the Copyright Act. 45
In White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.," the Supreme
Court upheld the manufacturers' view that a perforated music roll did
not constitute a "copy" of the underlying musical work within the
meaning of the Copyright Act, since a music roll was not a written or
printed record of the composition in intelligible notation. 47 The Court
made it clear, in dictum, that the rationale of its holding was also ap-
plicable to phonograph recorcls, 4 " which, like perforated rolls, are
merely " [component] parts of a machine which, when duly applied
and properly operated in connection with the mechanism to which
they are adapted, produce musical tones in harmonious
combination."'"
" H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1909); see Goldstein, 412 U.S. at
563-66.
" H.R. REP. No.487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971).
12 412 U.S. at 571.
43 H.R. REP. No. 7083, 59th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 2 (1907) (Minority Report).
" Act of Feb. 3, 1831, § I, 4 Stat. 436. See White-Smith Music Co. v. Apollo Co.,
209 U.S. I, 17 (1908).
45 White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 7 (1908).
" 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
41 /d. at 17.
4X Id.
" See id. at 18.
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The effect of the White-Smith decision was to create a copyright
scheme which did not entitle a composer to partake of the commerical
exploitation of his own musical work. Congress, in an effort to correct
the patent unfairness of this scheme did not choose the obvious solu-
tion of simply overruling the rationale of White-Smith by statutorily
designating sound recordings as "copies" of the underlying work. It
feared, with good reason, that an exclusive right to duplicate musical
compositions in the form of sound recordings would lead to
monopoly. 5° In a compromise solution designed to secure to compos-
ers a just compensation for their creative efforts and at the same time
preclude the development of a music. trust, Congress created the
compulsory licensing scheme. 5 ' This feature of the copyright laws
granted to a composer the exclusive right to determine when and how
his work would first be recorded; but once this right was exercised,
anyone else was free to make a "similar use" of the work upon pay-
ment of a statutory royalty to the composer. 52
It is clear, then, from this brief history, that in enacting section
1(e), Congress did not intend "to extend the right of copyright to the
mechanical reproductions themselves, but only to give the composer
or copyright proprietor the control ... of the manufacture and use of
such devices." 53 It is also now settled that in no other section of the
Copyright Act did Congress intend to extend copyright protection to
recordings. 54 Thus, with respect to records and tapes fixed prior to
1972, a tape pirate's duplication of musical productions violates no
federally protected interest of the record or tape manufacturer.
II. THE TAPE PIRACY CASES
In spite of the clear legislative intent not to protect mechanical
reproductions under section 1(e), 55 and in spite of the settled judicial
view that categories of writings not specifically enumerated in the Act
are ineligible for federal protection," the Tape Piracy cases concluded
that pre-1972 sound recordings which contain performances of
5 " See H.R. REP. No.2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1908). The Apollo Company,
a leading manufacturer of perforated music rolls, and one of the litigants in the
White-Smith case, is a good example of the potential for monopoly. At the time
White-Smith was being litigated, the company had entered into contracts with more than
eighty publishing houses under which Apollo acquired the exclusive rights to mechani-
cal reproduction of all copyrighted music which the publishing houses might acquire
over a period of thirty-five years. Id.
5 ' 17 U.S.C. 	 1(e) (1970). See note 2 supra.
52 1d.
53 H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1908).
"Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 567-69.
"See id. at 566. "Nowhere does the 11909 committee] report indicate that Con-
gress considered records as anything but a component part of a machine, capable of
reproducing an original composition or that Congress intended records, as renderings
of original artistic performance, to be free from state control." Id. (emphasis in original).
"See id. at 567-69.
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copyrighted musical works may not be pirated." One authority cited
by the cases in support of this view was Aeolian Co. v. Royal Music Roll
Co., 58 a case decided by the United States District Court for the West-
ern District of New York in 1912. In Aeolian, a compulsory licensee
who manufactured music rolls sought to enjoin the defendant from
allegedly infringing the copyright of the underlying musical work by
duplicating plaintiff's perforated rolls." In granting the injunction the
district court said:
The provision of the statute [section 1(e)) that "any other
person may make similar use of the copyrighted work" be-
comes automatically operative by the grant of the license;
but the subsequent user does not thereby secure the right
to copy the perforated rolls or records. He cannot avail him-
self of the skill and labor of the original manufacturer rf the per-
forated roll or record by copying or duplicating the same, but
must resort to the copyrighted composition or sheet music,
and not pirate the work of a competitor who has made an
original perforated roll.""
The Aeolian case has been criticized for.allowing a licensee to sue for
an infringement of the licensor's copyright, thereby indirectly giving
the licensee the copyright protection which Congress had refused to
give directly."' The opinion is also subject to attack on another
ground: its apparent conclusion that "similar use" creates an implied
condition that a subsequent licensee may not duplicate the product of
the efforts of a prior licensee is truly an ipse dixit. Although the ques-
tion of what Congress intended by the phrase any other person may
make similar use of the copyrighted work"' was one of first impres-
sion, the court failed to discuss the question in the context of the con-
troversy which had first led to the Supreme Court's decision in
White-Smith and then to Congress' compromise solution in the 1909
Act." It is likely that, if the court had considered these interpretive
guides, it would have reached a contrary conclusion.
This failure is significant, not only because all four Tape Piracy
" Fame Publishing, 507 F.2d at 559-70; jondora Music, 506 F.2d at 395; Marks
Musk, 497 F.2d at 288; Duchess Musk, 458 F.2d at 1310.
38 196 F.926 (W.D.N.Y. 19 1 2).
88 Id. at 927.
"" Id. (emphasis added).
" See Note, supra note 25 at 444-45.
" 2 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1970).
" 3 As Professor Landis observed:
It must be insisted that the legislative purposes and aims are the
important guideposts for statutory interpretation, tint the desiderata of the
judge. And there is a world of difference between an attitude of mind that
honestly seeks to grasp these and give them effect, and one that cavalierly
throws them overboard and leaves us to the mercy of the [judge I.
Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 11 Atty. L. Ray. 886, 891-92 (1930). Compare id,
with note and text at note 90 infra.
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cases generally relied on Aeolian as supportive of their respective
holdings," but also because of the manner in which one of the Tape
Piracy courts cited Aeolian on the question of the congresssional intent
underlying section 1(e). In Edward B. Marks Music, Inc. v. Colorado
Magnetics, Inc., 65 the defendants argued that Congress did not intend
to proscribe the pirating of sound recordings through its enactment
of section . 1(e). 6° In support of this contention they relied on Con-
gress' explicit understanding at the time of passage of the 1971 Sound
Recording Act that: "[i]f the unauthorized producers [of sound
recordings] pay the statutory mechanical royalty required by [section
1(e)] for the use of copyrighted music, there is no federal remedy
currently available to combat the unauthorized reproduction of the
recording."' The dissents in several Tape Piracy cases explicitly relied
on this congressional understanding." Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit
rejected this view, noting that a court is not bound by a congressional
interpretation of a prior existing law, particularly when the interpreta-
tion comes decades after the passage of that law." In contradistinc-
tion to the 1971 congressional view, the court posed the Aeolian
opinion, which, because it was decided only three years after the
enactment of the 1909 revisions of the Copyright Act, was considered
to be a more accurate interpretation of section 1(e). 7" Relying on
Aeolian, the court concluded that the pirating of sound recordings
was, in fact, proscribed by section 1(e)."'
Although under some circumstances deference based solely on
proximity in time may be justified, it certainly is not warranted in the
present situation; whatever value Aeolian might have had as a fresh in-
terpretation of the 1909 Act was negated by its failure to resort to the
legislative history of the Act to resolve the patent ambiguity of the
language of section 1(e). Given this unwarranted deference, it is not
surprising to find that the Aeolian rationale is echoed in the Tenth
Circuit's explanation of the scope of the license created by section
1(e):
[U]nder the statute Magnetics may "use" the copyrighted
64 Fame Publishing, 507 F.2d at 671; Jondora Music, 506 F.2d at 394; Marks Music,
497 F.2d at 289-90; Duchess Music, 458 F.2d at 1310.
" 497 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1974).
" 497 F.2d at 289.
64 H.R. REP. No.487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971).
" fondora Music, 506 F.2d at 401 (dissenting opinion); Duchess Music, 458 F.2d at
1311-12 (dissenting opinion), citing H.R. REP. No.487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). The
dissent in Duchess Musk also relied on Professor Nimmer: "Assuming such a record pi-
rate duly serves a notice of intent to use and pays the compulsory license royalties, the
somewhat astounding result is that he is not an infringer under the Copyright Act." 458
F.2d at 1312 (dissenting opinion), quoting Nimmer on Copyright 430-31 (1970). See also
ondora Musk, 506 F.2d at 400 (dissenting opinion), quoting Ninatner on Copyright 431
(1972).
" 497 F.2d at 289.
"Id. at 289-90.
4 ' Id.
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composition in a manner "similar" to that made by the
licensed recording company. All of which means, to us, that
Magnetics may make its own arrangements, hire its own
musicians and artists, and then record. It does not mean
that Magnetics may use the composer's copyrighted work
by duplicating and copying the record of a licensed record-
ing company. Such, in our view, is not a similar use."
This language is unmistakably similar to that set out in Aeolian." Un-
like Aeolian, however, the court in Marks Music at least took notice of
the fact that there was a legislative history to the compulsory license
provision of the Act. 74 Nevertheless, without actually discussing this
history, the court dismissed it as "conflicting and indecisive"."
In the 1972 Tape Piracy case, Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern," the
Ninth Circuit also relied uncritically on Aeolian as authority for requir-
ing a non-identical use of copyrighted compositions." The 1975 case,
Fame Publishing Co. v. Alabama Custom Tape, Inc.," relied • not only on
Aeolian but also on the previous Tape Piracy cases which had uncriti-
cally relied on Aeolian." Only one Tape Piracy case,Jondora Music Pub-
lishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc.," represented an effort to depart
from the unanalytic reasoning of the other cases. Although the Third
Circuit in Jondora Music reached the same conclusion as its predeces-
sors, it did not rest its decision solely on the precedential value of
those decisions. It constructed an argument based, not on the specific
language of section 1(e), but on the general "spirit" of the 1909 Act."'
Congress revised the copyright laws in 1909, the court pointed out, to
protect the interests of composers."' The compulsory licensing provi-
sion was therefore not intended to penalize the composer but to pre-
vent one manufacturer from monopolizing the field of sound
recording." Given this history, section 1(e) should be interpreted with
a "spirit" that is protective of composers."
"Id. at 288 (emphasis in original). Compare id. with Aeolian, 196 F. at 927.
" See text at note 57 mop/a.
"497 F.2d 288.
"Id. The first Tape Piracy case to he leaded, Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 458
F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1972), sheds no more light on the proper meaning of the phrase
"similar use" than either of the opinions in Aeolian or Marks Music. The court limited its
discussion of the question to a statement that pirates who duplicate the sound record-
ings of others do not make a "similar use" of the underlying copyrighted compositions.
Rather, they make exact and identical copies of them. Id, at 1310. This conclusion is
simply followed by a citation to Aeolian. Id.
7" 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1972).
" 458 F.2d 1305, 1310 (9th Cir. 1972).
" 507 F.2d 667 (5111 Cir. 1975).
7 " 507 F.2d 667, 670-72 (5th Cir. 1975).
"" 506 F.2d 392 (3d Cir. 1974).
" Id, at 395-96.
82 /d. at 395.
"Id. at 395-96.
. 84 Id. at 396.
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The court then attempted to demonstrate how a composer's in-
terest in his copyrighted work is adversely affected when legitimate
sound recordings of that work are pirated. 85 To make a sound record-
ing a manufacturer must invest a considerable amount of money to
hire performers and to make a master recording. These cost factors
are then balanced against the anticipated number of copies that will
sell. Since the life of a popular record is generally short, the profit
margin of a manufacturer depends in large part on how many copies
are sold in the first few months following release."
The pirate's initial investment, on the other hand, is much
smaller: the purchase of one record or tape. In addition, the risk fac-
tor is non-existent for him, since the pirate can make his judgment on
which recordings to reproduce on the basis of the record charts. If
the pirate works quickly enough, he can siphon off a substantial
amount of the record manufacturer's profits in the few months fol-
lowing the initial release of the performance. 87 Because the record
manufacturer's market is thus reduced by the pirated records, his in-
centive to market other popular records is diminished. This in turn
becomes a detriment to the composer, since the record manufacturer's
diminished enthusiasm and profits means that the composer will have
to endure less costly productions of his works and, quite possibly, less
exposure to the public. 88 "To this extent, the interests of the com-
poser and manufacturer coincide in combatting piracy." 8 "
The thrust of the court's argument is that composers as a group
will, in the long run, receive fewer royalties because fewer of their
compositions will be recorded as a result of the inroads made in the
legitimate recording, industry by the pirates. This long range threat,
the court concluded, compels a court to interpret section 1(e) in a way
that eliminates the threat."
All four of the Tape Piracy cases state that a pirate infringes a
composer's proprietary interest because, by duplicating without au-
thorization the recording of a "legitimate" manufacturer, the pirate
makes an "identical" rather than a "similar" use of the underlying
musical work."' Implicit in this conclusion is the assumption that the
89 Id.
8111d .
" Fame Publishing, 507 F.2d at 668.
" jondora Music, 506 F.2d at 396.
89 Id.
"See id; cf. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 415 U.S.
394 (1974), where the Court decided, inter alia, that "distant signal" importation is not a
"performance" within the meaning of the Copyright Act. The commercial television
networks had contended that this holding, which allows license-free "distant signal" im-
portation, would have an adverse economic impact on the advertising markets of
broadcast television. The Court dismissed this suggestion as irrelevant to the copyright
question, indicating that any readjustment of existing economic arrangements "would
entail extended fact finding and a legislative, rather than a judicial, judgment." Id. at
413-14 n.15.
" Fame Publishing, 507 F.2d at 669-70; Jondora Music, 506 F.2d at 395; Marks
Musk, 497 F.2d at 288; Duchess Musk, 458 F.2d at 1310.
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pirate's failure to hire musicians, pay for studio recording time and
generally create a unique performance of the composer's work de-
tracts from the value of the copyright with which the statute has re-
warded the composer's creative efforts. This assumption has no logical
foundation. From a strictly economic point of view, the property in-
terest which is invaded by a pirate's failure to stage a unique per-
formance is that of the manufacturer, not the composer. It is the
manufacturer's economic investment' in musicians' fees and studio re-
cording expenses which is misapprOpriated by the pirate. Moreover,
so long as the pirate pays the composer the statutory royalties for
each unauthorized duplicate recording, the pirate has avoided the
mischief which Congress sought to remedy in 1909, namely, the
composer's being deprived of a share of the economic returns gener-
ated by the mechanical reproduction , of his creative efforts."
Indeed, the economic picture painted by the court in Jondora
Music is an incomplete one, since it does not take into account the
short range possibility that individual'composers will actually profit if a
pirate who complies with section •1(e) markets pirated recordings of
their musical works. Under the compulsory licensing system, the sole
measure of the composer's profits is the number of records sold for
which statutory royalties are paid. Except where the composer has
contracted for a higher royalty in the case of the first use of his com-
position, it makes no difference to the composer whether the price
paid by the consumer, minus the two cent royalty, lines the pocket of
the pirate or of the record manufacturer. Furthermore, to the extent
that the cut-rate price offered by the pirate induces a consumer to
purchase a record which he is unwilling' to purchase at the higher
price of the manufacturer, the composer enjoys an unexpected gain
from the marketing of pirated recordings , of his musical work. In the
short run, then, the composer's interests are likely to be adverse to
those of the manufacturer.
Finally, taking into account the, fact that Congress, by passage of
the Sound Recording Act, has effectively neutralized the long range
threat which so troubled the court of appeals," the practical effect of
the Tape Piracy cases is clear. Under the guise of protecting the
composer's proprietary interest in his copyrighted musical work, the
courts have extended copyright protection to the recording itself."
1' 2 Goldstein, 412 U.S, at 565.
"jortdorn Music, 506 F.2d at 396.
94 It is riot suggested that a protective approach to the copyright laws is always
unwarranted. For example, in Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30
(1939), the copyright proprietor did not depdsit copies of the copyrighted material until
fourteen months after publication and six months after defendant had allegedly in-
fringed the copyright. The Court rejected an argument by the defendant that "al-
though prompt deposit of copies is not prerequisite to copyright, no action can be
maintained because of infringement prior in date to a tardy deposit," id. at 35-36, and
held that, "while no action, can be maintained before copies are actually deposited, mere
delay will not destroy the right to sue. Such forfeitures are never to be inferred from
doubtful language." Id, at 42. Washingtonian' may be criticized for doing violence to
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This judicially created facet of The composer's copyright interest
creates an unnecessary conflict with Congress' policy not to grant fed-
eral protection to mechanical reproductions fixed prior to 1972. Since
a composer ordinarily enjoys no discernible benefit from a require-
ment that each would-be mechanical reproducer of his musical work
stage an independent performance of that work, the only other possi-
ble beneficiary of such a requirement is the manufacturer who has in-
vested in such performances. Although the Tape Piracy cases avoid an
open conflict with this policy by predicating the requirement on the
property interest of the composer, the conflict is avoided at the ex-
pense of sound analysis.
III. A MORE CREDIBLE INTERPRETATION OF "SIMILAR USE"
There is a precedent for the view that the "similar use" proviso
of section 1(e) does not require a compulsory licensee to perform in-
dependently the underlying musical work. This precedent was niether
discussed nor cited by any of the four Tape Piracy cases. In the 1957
case, Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody," the Second Circuit rejected
the argument posed by retailers of pirated records that only the man-
ufacturers,- and not the sellers, of unauthorized recordings are liable
for infringement." The court held that even though the manufac-
turer subsequently complied with the notice requirements of section
1(e), the retailers were liable for those unauthorized records sold
prior to compliance with the statute. The court, therefore, appeared
to approve the view that a pirate who complies with section 1(e) can-
not be held liable for infringement. Implicit in the court's holding
that compliance with section 1(e) does not relieve a pirate of liability
for damages for the manufacture of records prior to compliance is a
belief that compliance with section 1(e) will relieve a pirate of liability
for subsequently produced recordings. 98
The central issue in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., however, was
whether the plaintiffs were to recover under the general damages
provisions of section 101(14 99—which allows a minimum recovery of
$250 for each infringement in lieu of proof of actual damages and
statutory language which is rather. clear. However, the result is a sensible one, in that
the statutory interpretation does not expand or contract any substantive rights; it
merely preserves a cause of action. The Tape Piracy cases, on the other hand, create a
de facto expansion of the categories of "Writings" which receive statutory protection.
The absence of any actual harm or injury in fact to the property interest of a
composer in those situations where a pirate tenders the statutory royalties prompted
one dissenting judge to conclude that composers lacked standing to challenge the prac-
tices of such pirates. Fame Publishing, 507 F.2d at 675 (dissenting opinion).
"5 248 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1957).
"' Id. at 264.
" Id. at 264-65.
"See id.
9" 17 U.S.C.	 101(b) (1970).
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profits""---or under the specific provisions of the former section
101(e) dealing with mechanical reproductions of musical
works'"'—which limited recovery to the 2 cents royalty or a
discretionary allowance not to exceed the royalty trebled.' 02 The court
ruled that section 101(e) was the controlling and exclusive measure of
damages since it was part of a "different regulatory plan;" that is, sec-
tion 101(e) was addressed specifically to infringements involving
"parts to reproduce mechanically the musical work" and its damages
provisions remedied violation of the compulsory license scheme
through payment of the statutory compensation rather than payment
of actual damages or lost profits: 03
Implicit in this conclusion is the premise that what rendered the
recordings "unauthorized" under the Act was the pirate's failure to
pay the statutory royalties, and not his unauthorized duplication of a
recorded performance. This premise points once again to the conclu-
sion that as long as the duplicator pays statutory royalties to the com-
poser, piracy is not a violation of the Copyright Act. The Tape Piracy
cases are inconsistent with this conclusion for if, as those cases imply,
section 1(e) grants to the composer, in addition to his proprietary in-
terest in collecting royalties, a proprietary interest in having his com-
position performed independently by each compulsory licensee, sec-
tion 101(e) would be an incomplete measure of the harm inflicted by
pirates on these dual property interests. Liquidated damages in the
form of royalties would redress injury only to the former interest,
leaving the composer's interest in an independent performance with-
out an effective remedy.
The conclusion that Congress did not at all concern itself with
the problems of piracy when it enacted section 1(e) is further but-
tressed by the statutory scheme which is revealed when the broad pol-
icy purposes underlying section 101(b) are contrasted with the more
limited intendment of section 101(e). Section 101(b) requires infring-
ers of copyrights to pay damages to copyright holders and to disgorge
profits."' This section is a flexible provision, the Supreme Court has
said, which does not merely take away the profits of an infringer;
"" Id.
"" Id. § 101(e).
"'Id. In 1971, 4 101(e) was amended to delete the provision authorizing treble
damages where a record manufacturer failed to give notice to his use of the copyright-
ed composition. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, P.I.. No. 92-140, * 2, 85 Stat. 392. Instead, Con-
gress provided that "the unauthorized manufacture, use, or sale of [records or tapes I
shall constitute an infringement of the copyrighted work rendering the infringer liable
in accordance with all provisions of this title dealing with infringements of copyright
and, in a case of willful infringement ror profit, to criminal prosecution pursuant to
section 104 ...." 17 U.S.C, Si 101(e) (Supp. III, 1973).
I"' 248 F.2d at 265-66.
" 4 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970) renders an infringer of a copyright liable for "such
damages as the copyright proprietor may have suffered due to the infringement, as
well as all the profits which the infringer shall have made from such infringement ...."
Id.
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such a scheme "would offer little discouragement to infringers [and]
would fall short of an effective sanction for enforcement of the
copyright policy." 05 Therefore, the Court has concluded, section
101(b) should be interpreted as having been designed "to discourage
wrongful conduct" and to effectuate the broad policies of the
Copyright Act. ' ° 6
In contrast to the policy-vindicating measure of section 101(b)
are the paltry sums which were available under section 101(e): 2 cents
for each infringing "part," which may be trebled if the infringer failed
to file notice of intent to use the copyrighted work. 10 ' Surely these
amounts cannot be said to discourage piracy. Yet the Tape Piracy cases
would nevertheless have one conclude that Congress included in the
discouragement of record piracy among the policies it established
through the Copyright Act, despite the fact that it did not provide an
effective vindication of that policy)" Unless Congress intended to act
in such an irrational manner, it is clear that Congress could not have
intended to establish any federal policy with respect to record piracy.
Rather, sections 1(e) and 101(e) evince the much more limited pur-
pose of setting up a royalty-collecting mechanism by which composers
may recover the full extent of their property interest in mechanical
reproductions of their compositions)" This purpose was underscored
by the former trebling provision, which could be invoked only if the
manufacturer had failed to file notice of intent to use the copyrighted
work.'" By tying the trebling provision to the notice requirement,
Congress demonstrated its purpose of merely establishing a collection
mechanism because such a notice requirement is the only meaningful
F.W. Woolworth v. Contemporary Arts, Inc.. 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952).
1 " 7 17 U.S.C. 	 101(e) (1970). See note 102 supra.
"'"One might argue that Congress intended to discourage piracy by providing
for an injunction against such activity, 17 U.S.C. § 101(e) (1970), and by providing for
the impoundment and destruction of all reproductions infringing a copyright, 17
U.S.C. 101(d),(e) (1970). See Duchess Music, 458 F.2d at 1307-09. However, these rem-
edies are , equally applicable to all copyright infringement cases. Thus, in terms of rem-
edies, the only manner in which musical works cases are treated differently from other
copyright cases is with respect to the damages available. Because the damages in musical
works cases are so much less than the damages available in all other copyright cases,
one may reasonably conclude that Congress never intended to discourage record piracy
through the Copyright Act.
i" Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., inasmuch as it holds the retailer as well as the man-
ufacturer of pirated records severally liable for the § 1(e) infringement, 248 F.2d at
265, appears to allow a composer to collect at least double the full extent of his
economic interest in SOU nd recordings of his compositions. This result arguably may be
viewed as insuring a recovery of damages sufficient to vindicate the general copyright
policy of discouraging unauthorized duplication. More realistic is the view that this find-
ing of several liability simply assures the composer that the chain of infringement will
yield at least one defendant who can be located and who can pay the royalties. Cf. F.W.
Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228 (1952) (retailer, who was un-
aware that figurines it purchased from third party infringed plaintiffs copyright, held
liable for statutory damages of $5,000 and attorney's fees of $2,000).
'''' 17 U.S.C. * 101(e) (1970). See note 102 supra.
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way in which a composer can keep track of how frequently his com-
position is being used. Furthermore, nowhere in sections 1(e) and
101(e) are there any damage provisions, similar to those in section
101(b), which would serve to discourage one manufacturer from mar-
keting unauthorized reproductions of another manufacturer's re-
corded performance of the copyrighted work. Based on this statutory
scheme, one must conclude that Congress viewed such misappropria-
tion as affecting, not the composer's interest, but rather the
manufacturer's interest to which Congress finally granted federal pro-
tection in 1971 through the Sound Recording Act,"' and not in 1909
through section 1(e).
The question still remains, however, as to what Congress meant
by the phrase "similar use" if it did not intend to create an implied
condition that a compulsory licensee independently perform the
copyrighted musical work. An eminently sensible answer is suggested
in Standard Music Roll Co. v. F.A. Mills, Inc." 2 In that case the plaintiff
copyright owner had granted the defendant, a manufacturer of per-
forated music rolls, a license to use a "musical composition" in the
manufacture of musical rolls." 3 The explicit terms of the licensing
agreement, however, did not grant the defendant the right to repro-
duce the lyrics of the composition. Nevertheless, the defendant
printed the words of the song on slips of paper and packaged these
slips along with the musical rolls.'" In determining that the scope of
the copyright should be limited to the right originally granted to the
defendant in the licensing agreement, i.e., to reproduce the music but
not the lyrics of the composition, the Third Circuit relied on section
1(e)'s authorization of a "similar use":
Just how the reproduction is to be made, and whether it is
to he confined to the music or shall extend to the words
also, is in the first instance left for the owner to determine.
But after he has determined it, and has granted a license to
one person, he thereby opens the field to all others to do
the same, or a similar thing. If he license one person to re-
produce both words and music by the phonograph method,
other persons may reproduce them both by using the
phonograph. If he license one person to reproduce the
music by the automatic roll, others also may use the roll,
but they do not thereby acquire the right to print the
words." 5
Thus, the court in Standard Music Roll appeared to interpret "similar
use" as limiting the right of reproduction to the mode of the original
production. The case thus supplies a sensible answer to the question
"' Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, §§ 1(a), 2, 85 Stat. 391, 392.
12 241 F. 360 (3d Cir. 1917).
" 3 Id. at 361.
114 Id.
"2 Id. at 363 (emphasis added).
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of what right other than that of statutory royalties section 1(e) grants
to a composer: he may limit reproduction of his composition to the
lyrics or music or both.'" In addition, Standard Music Roll might be
read as recognizing a right to limit reproduction to a particular
instrument"?
The court's answer is compelling since it did not, as did the Tape
Piracy cases, resort to factors extrinsic to the statute, such as the
economic structure of the recording industry, 18 in order to provide
the composer's property interest with a meaningful content. Instead,
the court first identified the purpose of the compulsory license
provision—the "prevention of monopoly or favoritism in granting the
right to reproduce a musical work mechanically"""—then it defined
the circumscribed copyright interest created by section 1(e) in a way
that preserved the composer's general ability to choose the form of
reproduction without derogating from the anti-monopoly purposes of
the compulsory licensing scheme. 12" Such a limited construction of the
statutory term "similar use" seems preferable to the Tape Piracy cases'
more ambitious interpretation which is in harmony neither with the
legislative history of section 1(e) nor with the realities of the recording
industry.
IV. PROBLEMS OF FEDERALISM RAISED BY THE TAPE PIRACY CASES
As noted earlier, 12 ' the Tape Piracy cases broadly interpreted the
composer's property interest established under section 1(e). This
broad interpretation appears to be contrary to the Supreme Court's
decision in Goldstein v. Galifornia,' 22 which suggests a narrow definition
of the composer's property interest. Appellant in Goldstein challenged
a state statute which made the piracy of a sound recording a
misdemeanor,'" on the grounds that the statute conflicted with the
Copyright clause of the Constitution and the federal statutes enacted
thereunder.'" The Court first reviewed the history and purpose of
the Copyright clause and rejected the contention that, under the Con-
stitution, the states had affirmatively relinquished to the federal gov-
ernment all power to grant to authors "the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings."' 25
The Court then proceeded to consider whether congressional
'" Id. at 363.
'" See id.
'" See Fame Publishing, 507 F.2d at 570; fondora Music, 506 F.2d at 396.
1 " 241 F. at 363. .
•02 °
' 2 ' See text at notes 64-91 supra.
"2 412 U.S. 546 (1973). In fairness to the Ninth Circuit, it should be noted that
Duchess Music, which was decided before Goldstein, could not have foreseen the implica-
tions herein discussed.
"3 CAL. PENAL CODE 653(h) (West 1970),
124 412 U.S. at 548-49.
" 5
 Id. at 560, quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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enactments had preempted state regulation of the copyrighting of
sound recordings. The Court concluded, with respect to sound re-
cordings fixed before February 15, 1972, that Congress had remained
neutral: it neither granted such writings federal protection nor speci-
fically exempted them from state control. 1 '°
The holdings of the Tape Piracy cases do not, strictly speaking,
conflict with the Supreme Court's determination in Goldstein that
Congress had "drawn no balance"'" with respect to sound recordings
fixed before the effective date of the Sound Recording Act. The cases
were careful to state that their interpretation of the phrase "similar
use" as proscribing piracy was dictated, not by any federally protected
property interest in sound recordings as such, but by the composer's
property interest in the underlying musical work.'" However, the
Tape Piracy cases' definition of the composer's property interest is a
specious one.'" To the extent that the protection of this specious in-
terest results in the protection of another's property interest in sound
recordings as such, the Tape Piracy cases create a de facto federal
copyright in such works, a result which is at odds with Goldstein's
finding' 30 that no such federal protection existed prior to the 1971
amendments.
Based on that finding, the Supreme Court held that the states
were free to establish their own schemes to regulate record piracy.'"
Under this holding, the significance of Congress' leaving the regula-
tion of a category of "Writings" to the states is that the threshold
choice of whether or not the category of "Writings" should be
regulated is one for the states to make on the basis of interests which
may be of "purely local importance."'" The Tape Piracy cases, by in-
troducing federal controls over a significant portion of pre-1972
sound recordings' 33 effectively prevent the states from exercising this
choice. As the recording industry's exertions in the Tape Piracy cases
indicate, the sanctions available in a federal forum for violation of the
federal copyright interest seem clearly preferable to piecemeal litiga-
tion on a state-by-state basis. The likely result of the Tape Piracy cases,
then, is the increasing use of federal rather than state law in combat-
ting record and tape piracy.
It does not follow from the results in the Tape Piracy cases, how-
ever, that federal copyright law preempts the states' role in regulating
pre-1972 sound recordings. Goldstein is still the law of the land with
1 " 412 U.S. at 570.
1 " Id.
22" See Fame Publishing, 567 F.2d at 670; jondora Music, 506 F.2d at 395-96; Marks
Musk, 497 F.2d at 290.
1" See text at notes 85-86 supra.
13° 412 U.S. at 566.
' 3 '1d. at 571.
"'See id. at 558.
1 " See text at notes 134.38 infra.
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respect to state competence to regulate such works.'" Furthermore,
the Supreme Court could conceivably reconcile the holdings of the
Tape Piracy cases with its own holding in Goldstein by recognizing an
artificial distinction between the property interest protected by federal
law and that which may be protected by state law. However, while the
effect of such a reconciliation would not eliminate the states' role in
the matter altogether, it would diminish that role to a great degree
since federal sanctions would likely displace reliance on the varying
remedies and requirements of state laws. An analysis of the market
for sound recordings further demonstrates why. This market, gener-
ally speaking, consists of two types of music: "popular" and classical.
The classical audience is a relatively small one: sales of classical re-
cordings declined from 12% of total sales of sound recordings in 1960
to 5% in 1969. 135 Since the repertory of classical music consists almost
entirely of works in the public domain, no federal copyright is
available.'" Therefore, the states effectively have exclusive regulatory
control over sound recordings reproducing these compositions. The
popular music field, on the other hand, consists mostly of works not
yet in the public domain. This is by far the larger segment of the
pirate's market. If the Supreme Court accepts the Tape Piracy cases'
theory of regulation based on the underlying composer copyright, this
large segment of non-public domain, and therefore copyrightable,
works will fall for practical purposes within federal regulatory
competence. 13 ' In the expanding market of popular recordings the
Tape Piracy cases will have disturbed the important role which Gold-
stein envisaged was the states' to exercise over pre-1972 sound
recordings.'"
It is suggested that where the interpretation of the Copyright
Act necessarily implicates an area of legitimate and substantial state
concern, the federal courts should not intrude into that area merely
to insure uniformity of a general policy of the Act.' 39 The Tape Piracy
' 3 ' As the dissents noted in Jondora Music, 506 F.2d at 400-01, and Fame Publish-
ing, 507 F.2d at 675, Goldstein's conclusion that state regulation was permissible, 412
U.S. at 571, necessarily assumed that Congress had not undertaken to regulate sound
recordings fixed prior to 1972. Had Congress regulated the field, "state action would
be barred, since Congress would have indicated its felt view that a national uniform pol-
icy was necessary, and not a piecemeal state-by-state approach." Fame Publishing, 507
F.2d at 675 (dissenting opinion). Thus, the Tape Piracy cases are inconsistent with
Goldstein insofar as they discern congressional regulation of conduct which the Supreme
Court impliedly found to be unregulated.
"5 Id. at 363.
ne 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970) provides that "iiIhe copyright secured by this title shall
endure for twenty-eight years from the date of first publication" and provides for a
right of renewal for an additional twenty-eight years. Id. § 7 provides that "In)o
copyright shall subsist in the original text of any work which is in the public
domain ...."
' 3 ' See text at notes 134-38 supra.
13° Of course, as the copyrights in the underlying musical works of these record-
ings expire, exclusive control over piracy of reproductions area will revert to the states.
33 Cf. DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956). In DeSylva, the Supreme
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cases violate this precept. Goldstein made it clear that the regulation of
sound recordings fixed before the effective date of the Sound Record-
ing Act is an area of legitimate and substantial state concern because
Congress had determined that such "Writings" were not deserving of
federal protection!'" The substantial state concern in this area is further
underscored by the fact that, due to the paltry damages available
under section 101(e), complete redress for the economic injuries in-
flicted by the pirates can only be had by recourse to the common law
doctrine of unfair competition. Since section 1(e) of the Copyright Act
is not equipped to provide the complete economic relief which the
states may provide, the only rationale for bringing the piracy of
pre-1972 sound recordings within the purview of the federal
copyright scheme is the resulting availability of federal injunctive re-
lief on a nation-wide bhsis. It is submitted that the recording
industry's interest in the convenience afforded by such uniform relief
is insufficient to justify the derogation from the pre-eminent role
which Goldstein had indicated was the states' to play in this area.
CONCLUSION
The immediate effect of the Tape Piracy cases, as noted, is to ex-
tend federal civil liability to pirates of sound recordings fixed prior to
1972. As a further result of the Tape Piracy cases, pirates may now be
exposed to federal criminal sanctions as well. In 1971, when Congress
passed the Sound Recording Act, it created for the first time criminal
liability for "willful infringement for profit"'"' resulting from non-
compliance with section 1(e). Prior to that time, the holder of a musi-
cal composition copyright had available only the threat of civil liability,
in the form of statutory royalties, to insure compliance with the com-
pulsory license scheme. In the words of the House Report which ac-
companied the Act, Congress created this criminal sanction "to pre-
vent piracy of already existing records of copyrighted musical works
where the pirate does not pay the statutory royally to the holder of the
musical copyright. ”I42
In the wake of the holding of the Tape Piracy cases that section
1(e) contains an implied condition that a licensee independently per-
form a copyrighted musical composition, one federal district court has
held that a pirate who duplicates a sound recording not directly eligi-
Court, finding "no federal law of domestic relations, which is primarily a matter of state
concern," id. at 580, concluded that it was proper to draw on the ready-made body of
state law to define the word "children" in section 24 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §
24 (1970). Id. at 580-81; cf Gilona v. American Guarantee Co., 391 U.S. 73, 81 n.9
(1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Court in DeSylva remarked: "[Although] [Ole scope
of a federal right [such as a copyright ] is, of course, a federal question, [this ) does
not mean that its content is not to be determined by state, rather than federal law." 351
U.S. at 580.
"" 412 U.S. at 566, 570.
' 4 ' 17 U.S.C. § 101(e) (Supp. III, 1973).
" 2 H.R. REP. No.487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1971) (emphasis added).
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ble for federal copyright protection, and who tenders the statutory
royalties to the composition copyright holder, nevertheless is crimi-
nally liable for willful infringement.' 43 Not only is a finding of crimi-
nal liability inconsistent with the Congressional view, noted above, that
such a penalty was intended to attach only to those who failed to pay
the statutory royalties, it is also at odds with the Goldstein view that,
with respect to sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972,
"Congress has drawn no balance; rather, it has left the area unat-
tended ...." 144
 Needless to say, the availability of federal criminal
sanctions to protect the music industry's economic interest in pre-1972
sound recordings is hardly consistent with a finding of Congressional
neutrality with respect to such recordings.
The availability of state criminal penalties for the unauthorized
duplications of sound recordings ineligible for federal copyright pro-
tection provided the context in which the Supreme Court carved out
an active role for the states to play in this area of Copyright law.
Perhaps the emergence of federal sanctions, as the ineluctable result
of the Tape Piracy cases, will move the Supreme Court in the near fu-
ture to revitalize that role by rejecting the interpretation of section
1(e) put forward by the music industry.
'" Heilman v. Levi, 391 F. Supp. 1106, 1113 (E.U. Wis. 1973).
'" 412 U.S. at 570.
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